Languages which conform to classical logic have extensions for which a consistent theory of truth can be formulated so that it satisfies the norms presented in Hannes Leitgeb's paper 'What Theories of Truth Should be Like (but Cannot be)'.
Let L 0 be a language which conforms to classical logic, and is without a truth predicate. By an extension of L 0 to a language L which has properties (i) -(ii) we mean the following: Sentences ¬A, A ∨ B, A ∧ B, A → B, A ↔ B, ∀xP (x) and ∃xP (x), where A and B go through all sentences of L 0 and P its predicates, are added if they are not in L 0 , and interpreted so that properties (ii) hold. Denote by L 1 the so extended language. Replacing L 0 by L 1 and so on, we obtain a sequence of languages L n , n ∈ N 0 = {0, 1, 2, . . . }, whose sentences are so interpreted that the properties (ii) are valid. This holds also for the language L which is union of languages L n , n ∈ N 0 . If A and B denote sentences of L, there exist n 1 and n 2 such that A is in L n 1 and B is in L n 2 . Denoting n = max{n 1 , n 2 }, then A and B are sentences of L n . Thus the sentences ¬A, A ∨ B, A ∧ B, A → B and A ↔ B are in L n+1 , and hence in L. If P is a predicate of L 0 , then the sentences ∀xP (x) and ∃xP (x) are in L 1 , and hence in L. Thus L has the syntactic properties (i). Because of the assumption that L 0 conforms to classical logic L has to be bivalent. Construct a language L 0 as follows: Its base language is formed by L, an extra formula T (x) and its assignments when x goes through all numerals, which are added if they are not in symbols of L. Fix a Gödel numbering to the base language. The Gödel number of a sentence (denoted by) A is denoted by #A, and the numeral of #A by ⌈A⌉. The construction of L 0 is completed by adding sentences ∀xT (x), ∃xT (x), ∀xT (⌈T (x)⌉) and ∃xT (⌈T (x)⌉), and sentences ∀xT (⌈P (x)⌉) and ∃xT (⌈P (x)⌉) for every predicate P of L. When a language L n , n ∈ N 0 , is defined, let L n+1 be a language which is formed by adding to L n those of the following sentences which are not in L n : ¬A, A ∨ B, A ∧ B, A → B and A ↔ B, where A and B go through all sentences of L n . The language L is defined as the union of languages L n , n ∈ N 0 . Extend the Gödel numbering of the base language to L, and denote by D the set of those Gödel numbers. Denote by P the set of all predicates of L. Divide P into three disjoint subsets.
is a true sentence of L for every x ∈ X P }, P 2 = {P ∈ P : P (x) is a false sentence of L for every x ∈ X P }, P 3 = {P ∈ P : P (x) is a true sentence of L for some but not for all x ∈ X P }.
n (U) = {A ↔ B : both A and B or both ¬A and ¬B are in
and
The above constructions imply that
The subsets G(U) and F (U) of D, defined by An interpretation of L 0 is defined as follows.
(II) A sentence of L 0 is interpreted as true iff it is in L(U), and as false iff it is in Q(U).
It follows from (2.6) and (2.7) that the above definition of L 0 and its interpretation (II) coincide to the corresponding definitions of [2] . Thus the results of that paper are available. The following properties are verified in [2, Section 3]:
The language L 0 interpreted by (II) conforms to classical logic.
A sentence of L is true (resp. false) in the interpretation of L iff it is true (resp. false) in the interpretation (II).
T is a predicate of L 0 when its domain is defined by
As a consequence of [2, Proposition 3.3] we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2.1. Assume that L 0 is a language whose sentences have meanings which make them either true or false, and is without a truth predicate. Then the language L 0 constructed in Section 2 can be interpreted by meanings of its sentences, and this interpretation is equivalent to that given in (II).
Proof. Let L 0 be a language whose sentences have meanings which make them either true or false. This bivalence remains valid for sentences of the language L constructed above when the sentences which contain logical symbols are interpreted by their standard meanings. Thus the object language L 0 has an extension L whose sentences have meanings which make them either true or false, which is without a truth predicate, and which has properties (i) and (ii). In particular, L is fully interpreted by meanings of its sentences, as defined in [2] . Meanings of the sentences of the language L 0 are determined by meanings of the sentences of L, by meaning of T (⌈A⌉), i.e., 'The sentence denoted by A is true', and by standard meanings of logical symbols. Results of [2, Subsection 3.2] are then available, and the conclusion follows from [2, Proposition 3.3].
A theory of truth and its properties
The next theorem, proved in [2] , provides a theory of truth for the language L 0 defined in Definition 2.1. Because the interpretation of L 0 can be definitional or semantical, we call, as in [2] , that theory definitional/semantical theory of truth, shortly DSTT. Hannes Leitgeb formulated in his paper [3] the following norms for theories of truth:
(n1) Truth should be expressed by a predicate (and a theory of syntax should be available).
(n2) If a theory of truth is added to mathematical or empirical theories, it should be possible to prove the latter true.
(n3) The truth predicate should not be subject to any type restrictions.
(n4) T -biconditionals should be derivable unrestrictedly.
(n5) Truth should be compositional.
(n6) The theory should allow for standard interpretations.
(n7) The outer logic and the inner logic should coincide.
(n8) The outer logic should be classical.
The next Theorem, proved in [2] , shows that the theory DSTT of truth satisfies these norms.
Theorem 3.2. The theory DSTT of truth formulated for L 0 in Theorem 3.1 satisfies the norms (n1)-(n8) and is consistent, i.e. free from contradiction.
The next result is a consequence of Proposition 2.1 and Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
Proposition 3.1. Every language whose sentences have meanings which make them either true or false has an extension possessing the theory DSTT of truth.
Remarks 3.1. The family of those languages having the theory DSTT of truth is extended in this note considerably from that presented in [2] . For instance, object languages can have only a finite number of sentences. If a language L 0 is bivalent, then preservation of bivalence in the extension of L 0 to L constructed in Section 2 is necessary and sufficient for L 0 to conform to classical logic. For instance, let L 0 be a language formed by a sentence and its negation. If both sentences are interpreted either as true or as false, then L 0 bivalent, but L is not. Thus L 0 does not conform to classical logic. On the other hand, if one of the sentences of L 0 is interpreted as true and the other one as false, then L is bivalent, and L 0 conforms to classical logic. If a language L 0 has properties (i) and (ii), it coincides with L. In this case L 0 conforms to classical iff it is bivalent. Thus any first-order language equipped with a consistent theory interpreted by a countable model conforms to classical logic. Mathematics, especially set theory, plays a crucial role in this note, as well as in [2] . Metaphysical necessity of pure mathematical truths is considered in [4] .
